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Abstract
Deutsch and Hayden claim to have provided an account of quantum me-
chanics which is particularly local, and which clarifies the nature of in-
formation transmission in entangled quantum systems. In this paper, a
perspicuous description of their formalism is offered and their claim as-
sessed. It proves essential to distinguish, as Deutsch and Hayden do not,
between two ways of interpreting the formalism. On the first, conserva-
tive, interpretation, no benefits with respect to locality accrue that are
not already available on either an Everettian or a statistical interpreta-
tion; and the conclusions regarding information flow are equivocal. The
second, ontological, interpretation, offers a framework with the novel fea-
ture that global properties of quantum systems are reduced to local ones;
but no conclusions follow concerning information flow in more standard
quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
The existence of entanglement, and the associated questions concerning non-
locality, are of perennial interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Latterly, following the development of quantum information
theory [6], entanglement assisted communication [7, 8] has presented a new
sphere in which puzzles may arise. In this context, an important development
has been the claim of Deutsch and Hayden [9] to provide an especially local story
about quantum mechanics by making use of the Heisenberg picture. Moreover,
they claim finally to have clarified the nature of information flow in entangled
quantum systems, reaching the conclusion that information is a local quantity,
even in the presence of entanglement. The aim of this paper is to assess these
claims.
Their discussion takes place within the context of unitary quantum mechan-
ics without collapse, and without the addition of determinate values; and they
proceed to make two claims to locality. First, they suggest, even in the presence
of entanglement, the state of the global system can in fact be seen to be com-
pletely determined by the states of the individual subsystems, when these states
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are properly construed (a conclusion not available in the usual Schro¨dinger pic-
ture and one supposed to chime with Einstein’s well-known demand for a real
state for spatially separated systems [10]). Second, the effects of local unitary
operations, again, even in the presence of entanglement, are explicitly seen to
be local in their picture.
However, before the implications of their formalism may be assessed, some-
thing needs to be said about how it is to be interpreted. Deutsch and Hay-
den are not explicit on this point and do not offer any interpretation. This
proves problematic as two different modes of interpretation of their formalism
may be discerned—what may be called the conservative and the ontological
interpretations—and quite different conclusions follow concerning the questions
of locality and information flow within these interpretations.
The conservative interpretation, perhaps the most natural way of reading the
Deutsch-Hayden paper, takes the formalism at face value, simply as a re-writing
of standard unitary quantum mechanics. In this case, we shall see, there are
no novel gains with respect to locality and Deutsch and Hayden’s claims about
information flow prove at best misleading. Under the ontological interpretation,
though, a dramatic departure from our usual ways of understanding quantum
mechanics is made and a wholly new range of intrinsic properties of subsystems
introduced. These would substantiate Deutsch and Hayden’s claims, but at a
certain cost of plausibility. We should note too that the ontological interpreta-
tion of the Deutsch-Hayden formalism is best seen as the postulation of a new
type of theory, rather than being a new way of interpreting familiar quantum
mechanics.
The discussion will begin in Section 2, where the machinery of the Deutsch-
Hayden approach is outlined, in particular, the mathematics that lies behind
the two claims to locality. These claims are then assessed (Section 3), for the
conservative and ontological interpretations in turn.
Note that in Deutsch-Hayden we have a formalism without collapse and
without the addition of determinate values. If we are to consider the question
of the locality of their approach, the appropriate comparisons are therefore with
other approaches that are consistent with this assumption. One the one hand we
should compare with a realist approach of the Everett stripe [11, 12, 13], while
on the other we should compare with a form of statistical interpretation, by
which I mean an interpretation in which quantum mechanics merely describes
probabilities for measurement outcomes for ensembles, there is no description of
individual systems and collapse does not correspond to any real physical process
for individual systems. The question to be answered, then, is: do Deutsch and
Hayden present us with advantages with respect to locality that are not also
shared by these other approaches? We shall see that under the conservative
interpretation, they do not.
In Section 4, attention finally turns to the question of information flow in
entangled systems. In Section 4.1 the nature of the question at issue is clar-
ified, before Deutsch and Hayden’s explanation of quantum teleportation and
their introduction of the concept of locally inaccessible information is consid-
ered (Section 4.2). Their claims regarding the nature of information flow are
then evaluated for the conservative and ontological interpretations in turn (Sec-
tion 4.3), along axes provided by three questions: i) Have Deutsch and Hayden
finally given the correct account of teleportation, as compared to related ac-
counts such as that of Braunstein [14]? ii) Is the concept of locally inaccessible
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information useful? iii) Have they provided us with a new concept of informa-
tion, or quantum information? We close with a brief summary.
2 The Deutsch-Hayden Picture
Deutsch and Hayden consider a network of n interacting two-state systems
(qubits, in the quantum computation literature) as their model of a general
quantum system. They take as the object describing the state of the ith qubit
at time t a triple
qi(t) = (qi,x(t), qi,y(t), qi,z(t))
of 2n × 2n Heisenberg picture operators satisfying the familiar commutation
and anti-commutation relations of the Pauli spin operators. To see how this
representation works, let us first recall the basics of the Heisenberg picture.
As expressed in the equations
〈ψ(t)|A|ψ(t)〉 = 〈ψ|U †AU |ψ〉 = 〈ψ|A(t)|ψ〉, (1)
time dependence in quantum mechanics can either be associated with the vector
(ket) representing the state, or with the operator representing the observable.
In the Schro¨dinger picture, the state ket undergoes unitary evolution (|ψ〉 7→
U |ψ〉); in the Heisenberg picture, the state ket remains unchanged and the basis
kets {|αi〉} of the Hilbert space are evolved (|αi〉 7→ U †|αi〉). Another useful
way of representing these facts is as follows.
It is well known (e.g. [15]) that the set of N ×N complex Hermitian matri-
ces forms an N2 dimensional real vector space, Vh(C
N ), if we define an inner
product (A,B) = Tr(AB), A,B ∈ Vh(CN ) and norm ||A|| =
√
TrA2. Just
as in our familiar examples of vector spaces, e.g. Euclidean R3, it is useful to
define a set of basis vectors for the space. We require N2 linearly indepen-
dent operators Γj ∈ Vh(CN ), and it may be useful to require orthogonality:
Tr(ΓjΓj′) = const.δjj′ .
Any observable can then be represented in this space in the form:
A =
N2−1∑
j=0
Tr(AΓj)Γj =
N2−1∑
j=0
AjΓj , (2)
where the Tr(AΓj) = Aj are the components of the vector A representing the
observable A. The density matrix ρ can also be written as a vector:
̺ =
1
N
+
N2−1∑
j=1
Tr(ρΓj)Γj =
N2−1∑
j=0
ρjΓj , (3)
where Γ0 has been chosen as 1, the identity. In this representation, the ex-
pectation value of A is just the projection of the vector ̺ onto the vector A:
〈A〉ρ = Tr(Aρ) = (A.̺). The equivalence between the Schro¨dinger and Heisen-
berg pictures now takes on a very graphic form. We can either picture leaving
the basis vectors (operators) as they are and rotating the vector ̺ under time
evolution, or we can picture rotating the basis vectors (and hence any observable
A) in the opposite sense, and leaving ̺ unchanged. In either case, the angle
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between the two resulting vectors and hence the expectation value is clearly the
same: A(t).̺ = A.̺(t).
Writing the time dependence out explicitly, we will have, in the Heisenberg
picture:
A(t) =
∑
j
AjU
†(t)ΓjU(t), (4)
while in the Schro¨dinger picture,
̺(t) =
∑
j
Tr(ρU †(t)ΓjU(t))Γj =
∑
j
〈Γj(t)〉ρΓj . (5)
The expectation value of observable A at time t is simply
∑
j Aj〈Γj(t)〉ρ.
Notice that in both expressions (4) and (5), the time evolved operators
Γj(t) = U
†(t)ΓjU(t) feature. These operators, along with their expectation
values 〈Γj(t)〉ρ, will be our main objects of interest.
What should we choose as basis vectors? For N = 2, the set of Pauli oper-
ators forms an orthogonal basis set, Tr(σiσj) = 2δij , (we adopt the convention
that σ0 denotes the identity) thus we can choose
√
2 Γj ∈ {1, σx, σy , σz} to pro-
vide an orthonormal basis {Γj}.1 We are then interested in the behaviour of
the set {U †(t) (σi/
√
2)U(t)}.
So far, all we have done is translate some very familiar results into the lan-
guage of the space Vh(C
N ). We now make the all-important move that provides
the core result of the Deutsch-Hayden picture (following Gottesman [16]). That
is, we note that unitary transformations of operators have the property of being
a multiplicative group homomorphism2:
U †ABU = (U †AU)(U †BU). (6)
In other words, the time evolution of a product will be given by the product of
the time evolution of the individual operators. Thus we do not need to follow
the evolution of the whole basis set of operators, but only of a generating set.
For example, in the N = 2 case, noting that σxσy = iσz, we see that σz(t) =
−iσx(t)σy(t) and that we need only follow the evolution of the generating set
{σx, σy} to capture the time evolution of the whole system. (For completeness,
note that σ2i = 1; the time evolution of the identity is of course trivial.)
For N = 2n, n-fold tensor products of Pauli matrices will provide us with
an orthogonal set, thus our basis operators will be
Γj =
1√
2n
σ1m1 ⊗ σ2m2 ⊗ . . .⊗ σnmn ; (7)
where the index j runs from 0 to (4n − 1) and labels an ordered n-tuple <
m1,m2, . . . ,mn>, mi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. We are interested in the behaviour of the 4n
Γj(t); again, however, we need only track the evolution of objects of the form
1⊗ 1⊗ . . .⊗ σimi ⊗ . . .⊗ 1,
1The choice of the Pauli operators as a basis set gives us the familiar Bloch sphere repre-
sentation of the density matrix of a two-state system.
2A map f : A 7→ B is a group homomorphism if ∀a1, a2 ∈ A, f(a1a2) = f(a1)f(a2).
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which we denote qi,mi ; the Γj are given by ordinary matrix multiplication of
these objects:
Γj =
n∏
i=1
1√
2
qi,mi . (8)
The behaviour of the Γj(t) is thus determined by following the time evolution
of a minimum of 2n of the qi,mi and taking appropriate products.
The qi,mi with mi running from 1 to 3 are, of course, the components of
the Deutsch-Hayden descriptor qi. This choice of three operators per system as
the basic objects whose time evolution we are to follow is more than is strictly
necessary for a generating set, but it leads to a very simple description of the
properties of an individual system, as we shall shortly see. First, however note
that the density matrix at time t can now be written as
̺(t) =
1
2n
∑
m1m2...mn
〈∏
i
qi,mi(t)
〉
ρ
∏
i
qi,mi . (9)
That is, the 4n components ρj(t) of the vector representing the density matrix at
time t are given by the expectation values of products of the qi,mi(t). The state
of the joint system at time t is thus completely determined by the time evolution
of the 2n or 3n chosen qi,mi and the initial state ρ. To see the significance of the
triple qi, note that any observable on the ith system alone will have the form:
Ai =
3∑
mi=0
Ami(1⊗ 1⊗ . . .⊗ σimi ⊗ . . .⊗ 1) = A01⊗n +
3∑
mi=1
Amiqi,mi , (10)
thus qi(t) tells about observables on the ith system at time t and 〈qi(t)〉ρ deter-
mines their expectation values. Equivalently, the three components of 〈qi(t)〉ρ
give us the interesting components of the vector ̺(t) lying in the subspace
spanned by observables pertaining to the ith system alone; and with renormal-
isation, the components, in our vector representation, of the reduced density
matrix of the ith system.
Explicitly, this reduced density matrix is:
ρi(t) =
1
2
∑
mi
〈qi,mi(t)〉ρ σimi . (11)
It is also easy to write down the reduced density matrix for any grouping of
subsystems. If we were interested in the systems i, j and k, say, taking the
partial trace of (9) over the other systems will give us a reduced state of the
form:
ρijk(t) =
1
8
∑
mimjmk
〈qi,mi(t)qj,mj (t)qk,mk (t)〉ρ σimi ⊗ σjmj ⊗ σkmk . (12)
So we have now seen the basis for the first claim to locality: given just
the descriptors qi(t) for each individual system, and the initial state ρ, we
may calculate the reduced density matrix for each subsystem, and the density
matrix for successively larger groups of subsystems, up to and including the
density matrix for the system as a whole.
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We may note in passing another interesting feature of the Deutsch-Hayden
formalism. A question that often arises, particularly in discussion of quantum
correlations, is whether different preparations of the same density matrix really
correspond to physically distinct situations, as all observable properties of sys-
tems having the same density matrix are identical. A pleasing aspect of the
Deutsch-Hayden set-up is that it provides a representation in which differences
in the way systems are prepared may find direct expression in the formalism3.
For example, it may be the case that 〈qi(t)〉ρ = 〈qj(t)〉ρ i.e. the two systems
have the same reduced density matrix, but that qi(t) and qj(t) differ, repre-
senting differences in their histories.
2.1 Locality claim (2): Contiguity
Let us now consider the second claim to locality. This, recall, was the claim
that it can be seen explicitly in the Deutsch-Hayden formalism that local unitary
operations have only a local effect. As Jozsa [17] has emphasized, this aspect
of the Deutsch-Hayden picture is in fact a re-expression of the no-signalling
theorem.
In the Heisenberg picture, a sketch of a simple version of the theorem would
be as follows: let us write an observable acting on subsystem i alone as Ai =
1 ⊗ A; at time t, Ai(t) = U †(t)(1 ⊗ A)U(t). Suppose U(t) does not act on i,
then Ai(t) = (U †⊗1)(1⊗A)(U⊗1) = 1⊗A, i.e. an observable is unaffected by
unitary operations on systems it does not pertain to. Now consider our qi,mi ;
the foregoing clearly applies to them — a unitary operation on a system j does
not affect qi,mi . More generally, if our network of n systems were divided up into
two subsets of systems, M and N , whose members interact amongst themselves
but not with systems from the other subset, then the unitary operator describing
the time evolution of the network will factorise: UM ⊗ UN . Then the qi,mi for
i ∈ M will not be affected by UN , nor those for i ∈ N by UM . We can do
more than merely note that the descriptors of a set of interacting systems do
not depend on unitary operations on a disjoint set, however. In fact we can
see that the descriptor at time t of a given system will depend, apart from
the history of operations applied to it alone, only on its previous interactions
and on the histories and past interactions of the systems it has interacted with.
This property may be called contiguity; and is best seen with a simple example
(Fig 1).
Imagine we have two systems, i and j and that we are going to perform
two unitary operations. First, at t = 1, we perform U1, which acts on j alone;
clearly, after this operation, qi,mi(1) = U
†
1
qi,miU1 = qi,mi . Next we allow i and
j to interact via U2; now, however, qi,mi(2) = U
†
1
U †
2
qi,miU2U1. Because U2 acts
on both i and j, U1 no longer factors out; interaction causes the qi,mi to lose the
form of a product of a single Pauli operator with the identity and they can pick
up a dependence on what has happened to the system that i has interacted with.
We can say that all this remains happily local, however, as this dependence on
the history of j only arises following an entangling interaction between the two
systems. The reasoning extends in the obvious way to more complicated chains;
if j had previously interacted with k, then once i and j interact, the qi,mi(t)
3Although, it must be noted that as we are in the context of no-collapse quantum me-
chanics, the possibility does not obtain of preparing a distant system in a particular way via
collapse, a` la EPR.
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ij U1
U2
t=1 t=2
qi(1)= qi
qj(1)=U1†qjU1
qi(2)=U†1U†2qiU2U1
qj(2)=U†1U†2qjU2U1
a)
i
j U’2
U’1
t=1 t=2
qi(1)= U’†1qiU’1
qj(1)=U’†1qjU’1
qi(2)=U’†1qiU’1
qj(2)=U’†1U’†2qjU’2U’1
b)
Figure 1: a) At t = 1, a unitary operation, U1, which acts only on system j is
applied; the descriptor of system i, qi(1), is unaffected. After i and j interact
via U2 at t = 2, however, qi(2) will depend on the operation U1. In (b) systems
i and j initially interact via U ′
1
. At t = 2, U ′
2
, acting on j alone, is applied;
qi(2) is unaffected.
pick up what they would not previously have had, a dependence on what has
happened to k; and so on.
To re-emphasize that the Deutsch-Hayden descriptor of a system at time t
will not, however, depend on what happens at t to a system with which it has
interacted in the past, we take the following simple example (Fig 1). Again
consider two systems i and j; this time, however, we begin by allowing them to
interact via a unitary operation U ′
1
, then
qi,mi(1) = U
′†
1
qi,miU
′
1 6= qi,mi , and
qj,mj (1) = U
′†
1
qj,mjU
′
1
6= qj,mj . (13)
Now we perform U ′
2
, which acts on j alone. Whilst qj,mj (2) = U
′†
1
U ′†
2
qj,mjU
′
2
U ′
1
,
for the descriptor of i we have
qi,mi(2) = U
′†
1
U ′†
2
qi,miU
′
2
U ′
1
= U ′†
1
qi,miU
′
1
, (14)
U ′
2
factors out; there is no immediate dependence on what happens at the present
only to j, even when i and j have interacted in the past.
The picture, then, is that following an interaction, the descriptor of a sys-
tem i picks up a backwards looking (and hence what we might call a local, or
contiguous) dependence on what has happened to the system that i has inter-
acted with, and on the previous interactions of that system. As an illustration,
let us consider how the non-factorisable probability distributions for Bell-type
experiments come about in this formalism (Fig. 2).
As usual, we begin by preparing a pair of systems (2 and 3) in an entangled
state. These systems are spatially separated and two local measurements per-
formed, at an angle θ on system 2 and an angle φ on system 3. The outcomes
are recorded into systems 1 and 4 respectively. Immediately following the mea-
surement, the descriptor of system 1 will depend on θ, but not on the parameter
characterizing the distant measurement, φ. However, as system 1 has interacted
with system 2, its descriptor will also depend on what has happened to 2 in
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HP(θ,φ)
θ
φ
1
2
3
4
Figure 2: A Bell experiment. An entangled state of systems 2 and 3 is pre-
pared (here by the action of a Hadamard gate, H, followed by a controlled-NOT
operation—the circle indicates the control qubit, the point of the arrow, the
target) and shared between two distant locations. A measurement at an angle
θ is performed on 2 and the outcome recorded in system 1; a measurement at
an angle φ made on 3 and recorded in 4. Time runs along the horizontal axis.
Note that in no collapse quantum mechanics without added values, correlations
do not obtain until they are displayed by a suitable joint measurement.
the past; which was, in this case, an entangling interaction between 2 and 3.
Similarly, the descriptor of 4 following the local measurement will depend on
φ and not on θ, but will depend too on what happened to system 3 — that
is, on 3’s initial entangling with 2. Because the descriptors of 1 and 4 depend,
following the pair of local measurements, on the initial entangling interaction
between 2 and 3, their product can give rise to the familiar non-factorisable
probability distribution when 1 and 4 are subsequently brought together and
joint measurements performed.
It is tempting to think of the contiguity property of the Deutsch-Hayden
descriptors as depicting a causal chain in which dependence on the parameters
characterising the history of a system is passed on during interactions, or even
more metaphorically, in terms of information about the relevant history of a
system being transmitted via local interactions. More soberly, we see that if the
qi are taken to be the primary objects of interest then the effects of local unitary
operations on these are indeed explicitly seen to be local, as the descriptor
of a system cannot come to depend on a parameter characterising a unitary
operation selected in a distant region without the system having undergone an
appropriate chain of local interactions. As we have said, however, this is just
the no-signalling theorem writ large.
3 Assessing the Claims to Locality
Having outlined the machinery of the Deutsch-Hayden approach, we may now
consider the status of its claim to provide a particularly local picture of quantum
mechanics. As remarked in the introduction, it is necessary to distinguish two
modes of interpretation of the formalism.
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3.1 The Conservative Interpretation
The conservative interpretation is to take the formalism at face-value, simply
as a re-writing of standard (unitary) quantum mechanics, in which we fix the
initial state ρ and track time evolution via the qi(t). If we want to talk in terms
of properties, we may see the qi(t), against the background of a chosen ρ, as
denoting propensities for the display of certain individual and joint probability
distributions for measurement outcomes, via equations (11) and (12).
3.1.1 Locality Claim (1)
The first claim to locality was that the global state can be seen to be determined
by the states of individual subsystems. What is certainly true is that given the
n qi(t), the 4
n Γj(t) are determined and hence we can keep track of the changes
to the joint system over time. Note, however, that the initial global state ρ still
has to be specified and plays a very important role. It is needed to determine the
experimentally accessible properties of individual and joint systems; both the
Γj(t) and ρ are required to determine expectation values of measurements. That
it is the global state is crucial, as in general in the presence of entanglement,
〈qi,mi(t) qj,mj(t)〉ρ 6= 〈qi,mi(t)〉ρ〈qj,mj (t)〉ρ.
With the global state of the system still playing such an important role,
however, it is not clear that we have yet gained much in the way of locality by
considering the Deutsch-Hayden construction under the conservative interpreta-
tion. Taking the simplest picture of a time evolving density operator, products
of the qi(t) determine how any given initial state will evolve; it is no surprise
if the initial state of the joint system is specified and we have kept track of the
changes to the system (albeit that these are fixed by the individual qi(t)) that
we then know what the final state will be.
In reply it is open to Deutsch and Hayden to argue that appeal to the global
state is in fact innocuous, as a standard initial state can always be chosen and
the qi(0) adjusted accordingly. To be sustained, however, this line of argument
commits one to the ontological interpretation, which we shall consider in due
course. For now, let us consider the status of the second locality claim under
the conservative interpretation.
3.1.2 Locality Claim (2)
We begin by asking why it might seem important to show explicitly that local
unitary operations have only a local effect. (We recall, of course, that the
standard no-signalling theorem already assures us that local unitaries will not
have any effect on the probability distributions for distant measurements). It
is clear that if we were only to consider the question of nonlocality as it is
usually raised in the context of Bell-type experiments, then the Deutsch-Hayden
approach would not offer us any distinctive advantages. For, as mentioned in
the Introduction, their point of departure is to assume no-collapse quantum
mechanics with no determinate values added, thus the appropriate comparisons
must either be with an Everettian or a statistical interpretation. But it is
well known that the Everett interpretation does not suffer from the familiar
difficulties with nonlocality in the Bell or EPR setting that accrue to theories
involving collapse or additional variables (indeed, this is often presented as one
of the selling-points of the approach); while for a statistical interpretation, the
9
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H1
2
A
B
Figure 3: Superdense coding. A maximally entangled state of systems 1 and
2 is prepared by Bob (B). System 1 is sent to Alice (A) who may do nothing,
or perform one of the Pauli operations. On return of system 1, Bob performs
a measurement in the Bell basis, here by applying a controlled-NOT operation,
followed by the Hadamard gate. This allows him to infer which operation was
performed by Alice.
familiar no-signalling theorem does all that could be required to ensure that
nonlocality does not arise (see [18] for further discussion and references). Thus
if one is considering the question of locality in this context, the crucial factor
is the assumption of quantum mechanics without a real process of collapse,
and without additional variables, rather than anything distinctive about the
Deutsch-Hayden approach.
However, things may look rather less clear-cut when one considers the phe-
nomena of entanglement assisted communication such as superdense coding [7]
and teleportation [8]. These phenomena vividly illustrate the fact that in the
presence of entanglement, local unitary operations can have a very significant
effect on the global state of the system. And might this not indicate a novel
sort of nonlocality of which even the Everett interpretation would be guilty? If
so, the Deutsch-Hayden approach would seem to offer a clear advantage, with
its explicit locality regarding the effects of local unitary operations.
Consider the example of superdense coding in more detail (Fig. 3). In this
protocol, Alice is able to send Bob two bits of information with the transmission
of a single qubit, by making use of the global effect of a local operation.
The two parties begin by sharing a maximally entangled state; let us say the
singlet state. Then, simply by applying one of the Pauli operators to her half
of the shared system, Alice may flip the joint state into one of the others of the
four orthogonal, maximally entangled Bell states: a local operation has resulted
in a change in the global state that is as great as could be — from the initial
state to one orthogonal to it. Now, if Alice sends her half of the shared system
to Bob, he just needs to measure in the Bell basis to determine which of the four
operations Alice performed, arriving at two bits of information. In this protocol,
the possibility of changing the global state by a local operation has been used to
send information in a very unexpected way. The phenomenon of teleportation
may also be viewed as arising from the fact that the set of maximally entangled
states may be spanned by local unitary operations [19].
So, does the example of entanglement assisted communication indicate an
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important sphere in which Deutsch-Hayden presents benefits of locality? Note
that these examples do not affect the question of locality for the statistical
interpretation, as on this interpretation the quantum state does not correspond
to anything real. But one might be interested in a more realist approach. Thus
we should ask how the Everett interpretation fares with locality in entanglement
assisted communiction.
It can in fact be argued that the examples of superdense coding and tele-
portation do not demonstrate a new form of nonlocality in Everett [18]. Our
worry is about the effect on the global state of local operations; however, even
if we are being robustly realist about it, the global state is not itself a spatio-
temporal entity. Thus changes in the global state do not correspond to local
or to non-local changes. It is better to think in terms of changes to proper-
ties of the systems; but it is clear that unlike the sort of change that would be
associated with collapse, the effects of local unitary operations that we are con-
sidering do not give rise to any changes in local and non-relational properties
of the separated systems (i.e., locally observable probability distributions are
unchanged). Thus, although certainly striking, and non-classical, the potential
global effects of a local unitary operation in the presence of entanglement are
not appropriately construed as non-local.
The case is clear enough for superdense coding; teleportation invites a fur-
ther brief comment. In the standard teleportation scenario, Alice and Bob again
share a maximally entangled state. Alice’s aim is now to send Bob an unknown
quantum state, rather than some classical information. She does this by per-
forming a Bell-basis measurement on her half of the entangled state and the
system whose state she is trying to transmit. This has the effect of flipping
Bob’s half of the entangled pair into a state that differs from the unknown state
by one of four unitary operations, depending on the outcome of Alice’s mea-
surement. If the outcome of Alice’s measurement is then transmitted to Bob,
he may perform the appropriate conditional operation to attain a system in the
state that Alice was trying to send. When this protocol is analysed from the
Everett perspective, the significant feature is that immediately Alice performs
her measurement, and before she sends a record of the outcome to Bob, Bob’s
system will already have acquired a definite state related to the state Alice is
sending, relative to the outcome of her measurement. Which may make us worry
again that there must be some nonlocality involved.
This feeling is quickly dispelled, though, when we note that what have
changed as a result of Alice’s measurement are the relative states of Bob’s sys-
tem. This means that we are talking about relational properties of his system.
But the fact that a relational property may change following an operation on
one of the relata does not imply a non-local effect4, as indeed these changes
in the relative states do not. This claim is further elaborted in [18]; Vaidman
[20] has also argued to the effect that teleportation does not involve nonlocality,
when understood in Everettian terms.
The conclusion is that when considered under the conservative interpre-
tation, the explicit locality in the effect of local unitary operations that the
Deutsch-Hayden formalism provides in the contiguity of changes in the qi(t)
4Consider the following classical example: We have two heaps of sand, x and y, piled on
the ground, some distance apart. Let us say x is heavier than y. By adding a few more
shovel-fulls to y, we may make this statement false; but this does not imply a non-local effect
on x.
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does not vouchsafe an important sense of locality that would be lacking in an
Everettian or statistical interpretation. Indeed we can see that it would neces-
sarily be quite misleading to suggest that the contiguity property points to a
novel feature of locality in the Deutsch-Hayden formalism interpreted conserva-
tively. As we have noted, the novelty must be supposed to concern the absence
of any effect on the global state from local unitary operations, even in the pres-
ence of entanglement; and this indeed follows, in a trivial sense, if we fix the
initial state ρ and track time evolution via the qi(t), adopting the Heisenberg
viewpoint. But what we described in the Schro¨dinger picture as a change in the
global state following a local operation now merely becomes, in the Heisenberg
picture, a change in the expectation values for some joint observables that can’t
be understood in terms of changes in expectation values for observables pertain-
ing to subsystems. But why, if we were supposed to be worried at all, should we
be less worried by changes in these joint expectation values as a result of local
unitary operations, than in changes to the global state?
3.2 The Ontological Interpretation
Maudlin, in the course of his careful discussion of the question of holism in
quantum mechanics, arrives at the following dialectical position:
We now have a reasonably clear question: according to the quantum
theory, can the physical state of a system be completely specified
by the attribution of physical states to the spatial parts of the sys-
tem, together with facts about how those parts are spatiotemporally
related? [21, p.50]
In standard quantum theory, the answer, of course, is no. The point of the
Deutsch-Hayden approach under the ontological interpretation is to answer in-
stead ‘yes’.
To see how this might be achieved, recall why the conservative interpretation
must fail to give an affirmative answer to Maudlin’s question.
In the conservative interpretation, the assignment of properties at a given
time is necessarily a joint venture between the global state ρ and the descriptors;
and as we noted (Section 3.1.1), appeal has to be made to global properties of
the state. The qi(t) cannot themselves be said to denote properties of the sub-
systems, rather, they determine what the effects of dynamical evolution would
be for any possible initial state of the whole system. It is only when some
particular initial state is specified that we may begin to talk about the prop-
erties of subsystems and of the whole; denoted by expectation values of the
qi(t) and products of the qi,mi(t), respectively. And we have already noted
a crucial feature several times: in general, the properties that are assigned to
joint systems (expectation values for joint observables, or propensities for the
display of certain joint probability distributions on measurement), will not be
reducible to properties assigned to subsystems (individual expectation values
and propensities).
The ontological interpretation departs from this in two ways. First, the
status of the global quantum state is fundamentally revised. A fixed stan-
dard state is adopted by convention (for example, the computational basis state
|0〉|0〉 . . . |0〉) and it is delegated to playing a purely mathematical roˆle in the
machinery of the theory, rather than representing any physical contingency. Its
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status is now simply that of a rule for reading off the observable properties of
systems. Secondly, the qi(t) are taken to represent intrinsic (i.e., non-relational)
and occurrent (i.e., non-dispositional) properties of individual subsystems. The
first feature is required of these properties if the global properties of the total
system are to be reduced to the properties currently possessed by its subsys-
tems; the second feature is a natural requirement in this context. A change in
the descriptor of a system now represents a change in the actually possessed,
intrinsic properties of the system. These intrinsic properties are clearly of a new
sort; and they do not receive any further characterisation or explanation than
is provided by their roˆle in the formalism. Thus on the ontological interpreta-
tion, the content of the first claim to locality is that the global properties of
the joint system are reducible to local, intrinsic properties of subsystems, while
the content of the second is that changes in the global properties are reducible
to changes in the currently possessed properties of subsystems. Under the on-
tological intepretation, then, we certainly have an interesting thesis. Note that
now, as adumbrated earlier, changes in the initial conditions of a system may be
reflected in changes in the qi(0), whereas under the conservative interpretation
they would be represented by changes in the time-zero density matrix, ρ(0)5.
It can hardly be emphasized enough that the approach of the ontological
interpretation marks a considerable departure from our usual ways of thinking
about quantum mechanics. Indeed it might best be thought of as the proposal
of a new theory, in which the behaviour of the intrinsic properties denoted by
the qi(t) is fundamental
6.
In gaining with respect to reducibility, however, the ontological interpreta-
tion acquires what might be felt to be some rather objectionable features. The
first is a problem of underdetermination.
The central, distinctive, claim of the ontological interpretation is that the
intrinsic properties of a subsystem, denoted by the descriptor qi(t) are funda-
mental. This means that there is a fact about which properties a given system
actually possesses at any stage; and thus also, a fact about what the true descrip-
tor of the system is. However the interpretation also involves a strict distinction
between observable and unobservable properties. The observable properties are
those that are given by expectation values. But this means that we can never
in fact know the true descriptor of a system. We only have empirical access
to expectation values and to the density matrices of systems, but continuously
many different qi(t) will be compatible with this data. The true descriptor of
a system could be any one of the many that would provide consistency with
both the density matrix of the subsystem (eqn. (11)) and that of the total sys-
tem (eqn. (9)). Thus the facts about the true descriptors; and hence about
the intrinsic properties that systems actually possess, although supposedly the
5A half-way house is unsatisfactory. One might adopt a conventional fixed initial state in
the conservative interpretation and adjust the qi(0) accordingly, but this would not eliminate
the global roˆle of the state in determining joint properties, i.e. we do not have reducibility to
individual properties, as in this interpretation the qi(t) do not represent intrinsic properties.
6Note, however, that the ontological interpretation of Deutsch-Hayden lacks a measurement
theory. Although we have a prescription for what the probability distributions associated with
various measurements will be, we do not yet have a description of the measurement process
itself, or of the obtaining of various outcomes, in terms internal to the theory. It might be
thought that some sort of Everettian approach could be adopted, but as the relative state finds
no place in the Deutsch-Hayden framework, it appears, at least prima facie, to be resistant
to standard Everettian analysis.
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fundamental reality, are empirically inaccessible. According to the ontological
interpretation, there is an important fact about what the correct descriptors
of a set of systems are, but any assignment of descriptors to such a set will
necessarily be underdetermined by the accessible data.
As a corollary of this point, it is worth remarking that the analogy Deutsch
and Hayden suggest between their descriptors and Einstein’s desired ‘real state’
for separated systems might be overstated. While it may be the case that under
the ontological interpretation, subsystems do indeed possess independent real
states, we would still face the epistemological problem that this real state could
never be determined by local measurements — we could at most only ever learn
the 〈qi(t)〉ρ for a system, when presented with a sufficient number of identically
prepared systems.
The second difficulty for the ontological interpretation, and one closely re-
lated to the underdetermination problem, is that the shift in meaning of the
qi(t), from determining time evolution for any given initial state, to denoting
intrinsic properties of subsystems, induces a worrisome redundancy. In the nor-
mal quantum mechanical picture one can think of the qi(t) in the following
way.
Take some fixed sequence of unitary operations performed on a group of
systems. This sequence will correspond to some particular evolution of the set
of qi(t). Now we could consider different initial quantum states for the set
of systems; these states would evolve variously under the sequence of unitary
operations whose effect is captured in the evolving qi(t). At any given time,
the actual quantum state of our group of systems could be one from a whole
range, depending on which initial state was in fact chosen. The evolution of
some particular initial state from time 0 to time t may therefore be said to
depict one history from the range of possible ones. To use the term favoured by
philosophers, the evolution of this state represents the history of one possible
world. A choice of different initial state is a choice of different possible world.
Now the qi(t) capture the effects of our sequence of unitary operations for
all initial states. Thus their time evolution can be said to depict the histories
of the entire set of possible worlds; whilst the world from amongst these that is
realised is determined by which initial state is chosen. However, when we move
to the ontological view, the very same structure (the sequence of time evolving
qi(t)) only represents a single world, as the choice of initial state is a fixed part
of the formalism. What seems like it can represent a range of possible worlds,
we are to suppose, can only represent a single one; and conversely, the structure
being used to describe a single world in the ontological Deutsch-Hayden picture
is one we know in fact to be adequate to describe a whole set of possible worlds
in quantum mechanics. Thus the Deutsch-Hayden picture, taken ontologically,
would seem to be extremely, perhaps implausibly, extravagant in the structure it
uses to depict a single world. This difficulty, whilst certainly not a knock-down
objection to the ontological intrepretation, nonetheless seves to highlight some
of its unpalatable features.
4 Information and Information Flow
We have seen that under the conservative interpretation, the Deutsch-Hayden
formalism does not confer any benefits with respect to locality that do not follow
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directly from adopting no-collapse, unitary, quantum mechanics as a basic the-
ory, and hence would be equally available with an Everettian interpretation, or,
if one were perhaps to allow a formal collapse, but deny that it corresponded to
any real process, on a statistical interpretation. With the ontological interpre-
tation, by contrast, we do find something new, but this is better characterized
as concerning the reducibility of global properties to local intrinsic properties of
subsystems, rather than being a question of locality or nonlocality.
One of the most important aspects of the Deutsch-Hayden approach, how-
ever, is the claim that their formalism finally clarifies the nature of information
flow in quantum systems; indeed, that it reveals that information can be seen
to be transported locally in quantum systems, the phenomena of entanglement
assisted communication notwithstanding. It is to this question that we now
turn. Again, the matter must be assessed independently for the two different
modes of interpretation of the formalism. We shall begin, however, with a few
general remarks about the topic of information flow.
4.1 Whereabouts of information
The puzzle that seems to be posed by the examples of teleportation and the
like is over the question ‘How does the information get from A to B?’. This is
a perfectly legitimate question if it is understood as a question about what the
causal processes involved in the transmission of the information are7, but note
that it would be a mistake to take it as a question concerning how information,
construed as a particular, or as some pseudo-substance, travels. ‘Information’ is
an abstract noun and doesn’t serve to refer to an entity or substance. Thus when
considering an information transmission process, one that involves entanglement
or otherwise, we should not feel it incumbent upon ourselves to provide a story
about how some thing, denoted by ‘the information’, travels from A to B; nor,
a fortiori, worry about whether this supposed thing took a spatio-temporally
continuous path or not. By contrast, we might very well be interested in the
behaviour of the physical systems involved in the transmission process and which
may or may not usefully be said to be information carriers during the process.
A second general point concerns what it might mean to ask whether or
not information is a ‘non-local quantity’ [9, p.1759]. Note that for the reason
just stated, information is not something that can be said to have a spatio-
temporal character, but nonetheless one can, in certain contexts, intelligibly ask
‘Where is the information?’ This question is a fairly specialised one, though: it
presupposes that we have some specific piece, or type, of information in mind
and asks where this may be found, in the sense of asking where one might learn,
or learn about, the fact, or facts, it pertains to. (And, of course, to specify
where something may be learnt is not to say that what is learnt has to be
located there.) Sometimes no very precise answer to this question in terms of a
designated spatio-temporal region will be possible, or particularly helpful.
As a particular example of the latter case, and one that will figure again
later, consider the following scenario of encrypting a message. Let us say that
Alice and Bob are spatially separated but share a secret random bit string, the
key. Alice also has in her possession a message she wishes to send to Bob, a
7Note that different answers to this question will be given depending on one’s interpretation
of quantum mechanics. For example, in an interpretation involving genuine collapse, action-
at-a-distance will play a crucial roˆle.
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string of bits denoting something; this is the information we are interested in.
At this stage, we can say that Alice’s notebook, in which the message is written,
contains the information. If she then encrypts the message by adding (mod 2)
the message string to the key, writes the result down (producing the cyphertext);
and destroys both the original message and her copy of the key, then the question
‘Where is the information now?’ leaves us without a straightforward answer. We
can’t answer by gesturing to Alice’s side, or to Bob’s side, or to the cyphertext,
since from none of these, taken individually, may we learn what the message was;
although if we had access both to Bob’s key and the cyphertext then we should
be able to learn it. A simple request for a location doesn’t have a useful answer
in this scenario. For this reason, we introduce further vocabulary and talk
instead of the message being encrypted in the cyphertext. It is not to be found
wherever the cyphertext is located, rather, it may be learnt whenever cyphertext
and key are brought together, and not otherwise; the asymmetry in the roˆles of
the cyphertext and key is captured by the fact that it is the cyphertext and not
the key in which the message is said to be encrypted (although not located).
The bald question ‘where is the information throughout this protocol?’ does
not, in this case, invite answers with sufficient articulation for a perspicuous
description of what is going on.
Deutsch and Hayden, however, have something specific in mind when they
raise the question of whether in quantum systems, information is a local or non-
local quantity. If it is the case that a joint quantum system can have global
properties that are not reducible to local properties of subsystems, then these
global properties might be used to encode and transmit information in a way
that cannot be understood as subsystems individually carrying the information.
This is what they would mean by information being a non-local quantity. The
issue is whether we can, in general, always understand an information transmis-
sion process involving quantum systems in terms of the properties of subsystems
being used to carry the information. The examples of entanglement assisted
communication, as usually understood, would strongly suggest otherwise.
We shall focus on teleportation as the most interesting case; and one which
displays the characteristic features at issue.
4.2 Explaining information flow in teleportation: Locally
accessible and inaccessible information
Let us recall once more what the teleportation protocol looks like in the ab-
sence of collapse (Fig. 4). Sharing a maximally entangled state with Bob, Alice
performs a joint measurement on her half of the entangled pair (4) and on a
system (1) prepared in some unknown state, with the result that the state of
Bob’s system (5), relative to the outcomes of her measurement, is changed in
a way that relates systematically to the unknown state to be teleported. At
this stage of the protocol, every system involved is now in a maximally mixed
state, i.e., the information that characterises the unknown state will not be
available to local measurements8. As we have seen, the protocol continues with
the sending of the systems (2 and 3) recording the outcome of Alice’s measure-
ment to Bob, who can now perform the conditional unitary operations required
8This would not in general be the case if the initial entangled state were not maximally
entangled, or if Alice’s measurement were not a perfect von Neumann measurement; with
these eventualities, the teleportation would be imperfect (fidelity less than 1).
16
R (θ)0 H
H
0
0
0
0
χ 
χσz
φ+
1
5
2
3
4
A
B
Figure 4: Teleportation. All systems begin in the 0 computational basis state.
Bob (B) creates a maximally entangled state of systems 4 and 5. System 1 is
prepared in some unknown state |χ〉, by a rotation depending on the parameter
θ. When system 4 is sent to Alice (A), she performs a measurement in the
Bell basis, recording the outcome in systems 2 and 3. Systems 2 and 3 are
transported to Bob, who performs a controlled-σz operation on 2 and 5,and a
controlled-NOT on 3 and 5. System 5 is left in the original unknown state |χ〉.
to disentangle his system (5) from the others, in such a way that it ends up
in the original, unknown, state. The information characterising the unknown
state is now available again to local measurements, but this time, only at Bob’s
location.
The crucial feature in this protocol is the change in the relative states that
is allowed by the global property of entanglement. Subsystems, therefore, do
not seem to be playing the roˆle of information carriers in teleportation, and this
conclusion is further supported by the fact that the only systems that are sent
from Alice to Bob during the protocol are both maximally mixed.
Deutsch and Hayden, though, wish to give an account of teleportation in
which information flow is local; that is, in which subsystems can indeed be seen
to carry information from Alice to Bob. In particular, they are concerned to
rebut claims such as that of Braunstein [14], who suggests that the information
characterising the unknown state is contained in the global system rather than
in subsystems during the protocol; or that of Penrose [22], who suggests that
the information must flow along a channel constituted by the initial shared
entanglement between Alice and Bob, first backwards, and then forwards again
in time9.
Clearly, a good starting point for the debate would be an appropriate cri-
terion for when a system may be said to contain information. Deutsch and
Hayden would seem to have one of two slightly different necessary and sufficient
conditions in mind, although they are not explicit.
They begin by introducing a fairly familiar sufficient condition for a system
9Note that the feeling that an explanation of this somewhat extravagant form is required
would seem to be motivated by a picture in which information is a particular, or substance;
which, it has been suggested, is misplaced.
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S to contain information about a parameter θ: If a suitable measurement on S
would display a probabilistic dependence on θ, then S may be said to contain
information about θ. Then a necessary condition for containing information is
presented: S can be said to contain information about θ only if its descriptor
depends on θ. These definitions motivate an informal argument of roughly the
following form: Let us say we have a group of systems that includes S; denote
this group by S ∪ S⊥. Assume that the descriptor of S alone depends on θ.
If we know that the group S ∪ S⊥ as a whole contains information about θ,
because global measurements would display suitable probabilistic dependence,
but S⊥ does not (as the descriptors of the systems in S⊥ do not depend on θ),
then the information must be in S, in virtue of S’s descriptor depending on θ.
Therefore from the fact that the descriptor of S depends on θ, we may infer
that it contains information about θ.
This conclusion would be underwritten by either one of the following two
definitions10:
Definition 1 S contains information about θ ↔ its descriptor depends on θ
Definition 2 S contains information about θ ↔ its descriptor depends on θ
and measurements on the global system S ∪ S⊥ would display a probabilistic
dependence on θ.
These two definitions differ as it is possible for the qi(t) to depend on θ, but
for ρ(t) not to (recall the problem of underdetermination). The second is rather
more natural, particularly if we are to tie the notion of information being used
to the context of definite communication-theoretic procedures.
With one of these definitions of containing information in hand, Deutsch and
Hayden’s claim for the locality of information flow follows directly from the con-
tiguity property of the changes in the qi(t). The proposal is that teleportation
should now be understood in the following way. System 1 is prepared in some
state characterised by the parameter θ; its descriptor now depends on θ. Fol-
lowing Alice’s Bell-basis measurement, the descriptors of the ‘message qubits’ 2
and 3 also come to depend on θ. These two systems, as they are transported,
carry the information about θ to Bob’s location, where, following a suitable
local interaction, the descriptor of his system (5) also comes to depend on θ.
We must note the further, crucial, point, however, that the systems 2 and 3
carry the information to Bob in a locally inaccessible manner. Although their
descriptors depend on θ, and hence the systems may be said to carry informa-
tion under the Deutsch-Hayden definition, this dependence may not be revealed
by measurements on the systems individually — their reduced density matrices
are maximally mixed.
Deutsch and Hayden define locally inaccessible information as information
that is present in a system, but that may not be revealed by individual mea-
surements on the system. The explanation of teleportation, then, is that the
10The two statements that follow must be understood as proposed definitions, as they are not
entailed by Deutsch and Hayden’s argument, just sketched. The argument uses the necessary
and the sufficient condition for containing information, and the rule of inference: if a group
of systems contains information about θ, and a subgroup does not, then the complement of
that subgroup contains the information about θ. However if we have more than one system
whose descriptor depends on θ, then all that the argument based on these principles allows us
to conclude is that their union contains the information, not each system individually, which
is the desired conclusion.
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message qubits do actually carry the information characterising the unknown
state to Bob, but they do so locally inaccesibly. The general conclusion is that
subsystems can always be thought to carry information in entanglement assisted
communication protocols (hence ‘information is a local quantity’), it is just that
these protocols involve locally inaccessible information.
4.3 Assessing the claims for information flow
How satisfactory is this account as an explanation of teleportation, and, indeed
as a general picture for information transmission in quantum systems? We shall
consider three questions: First, have Deutsch and Hayden finally given the cor-
rect account of teleportation, as opposed, say, to Braunstein? Second, is the
concept of locally inaccessible information useful? Third, do Deutsch and Hay-
den provide us with a new concept of information, or quantum information? We
must consider the answers to these questions for the two modes of interpretation
of the formalism in turn.
Before that, a preliminary remark. Recall that as properly understood, the
question ‘How does information get from Alice to Bob?’ is a question about the
causal processes involved in the transmission. It is clear that simply answering
‘the information is carried in the message qubits’ would not be enough to explain
teleportation on its own, as this information might never be made accessible
again at Bob’s location, or it might be made locally accessible, perhaps, but
not in such a way that Bob’s system is actually to be found in the original
unknown state. Obviously, the explanation has also to refer to the roˆle of the
initial entanglement and the changes in the global properties of the system
that this entanglement allows, and which the teleportation protocol exploits.
This suggests a moderate way of understanding the application of the Deutsch-
Hayden formalism in teleportation that would not involve commitment to their
claims about locality or information flow.
On this view, the advantage their formalism presents is simply in highlighting
the difference in roˆles played by the initial entanglement and the message qubits
in teleportation. The asymmetry in these roˆles is, as Deutsch and Hayden
point out, analogous to the asymmetry in the roˆles of the key and cyphertext
in classical encryption based on a shared secret random string11. Before the
final stage of the protocol, it is the message qubits, and not Bob’s qubit, that
have had the direct dynamical coupling to the system whose state is to be
teleported (reflected in the fact that their descriptors depend on θ) — compare
with the classical cyphertext, which is generated from the message. But it is
the correlations that are established between the relative states of the message
systems and Bob’s qubit, in virtue of the initial entanglement, that allow the
unknown state to be recovered by Bob. (Similarly, the classical correlations
between the key and cyphertext allow the encrypted message to be recovered).
This suggests that it may well be useful to distinguish between the question
of whether an analysis in terms of the qi(t) helps us understand an aspect of
teleportation; and whether the account in terms of information flow does so.
Returning to our three questions. The adjective ‘correct’ in the first question
might be understood in one of two ways; either correct simpliciter, or correct
11The analogies and, importantly, disanalogies, between entanglement and shared secret
bits are developed in detail in [23].
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given the background assumptions. In order to be correct simpliciter, the ac-
count of teleportation would clearly have to be, first of all, correct given the
background assumptions, while these background assumptions themselves also
have to be correct. The relevant background assumption when we consider the
conservative interpretation is that unitary (no-collapse) quantum mechanics is
our setting; this is the setting also for Braunstein [14], hence the point of the
comparison.
4.3.1 Conservative interpretation
From the previous remarks on the conservative interpretation, we know that the
assignment of properties to systems involves both the global state and the qi(t):
we do not have reducibility of global properties to properties of subsystems and
therefore subsystems cannot, after all, always be thought to carry information
in entanglement assisted communication. It makes no odds whether one adopts
the Heisenberg or the Schro¨dinger viewpoint, it is still the case that joint (and
irreducible) properties of subsystems are being used to carry information in
the protocols. In Braunstein’s account of teleportation, after Alice’s Bell-basis
measurement, the information characterising the unknown state is said to be in
the correlations between the message qubits and Bob’s qubit, i.e., it is carried
by certain joint properties of these systems. The same is true in the Deutsch-
Hayden setting, understood conservatively; so we are not in fact being offered a
substantially different account of teleportation. This entails part of the answer
to the second question.
Under the conservative interpretation, there is an important sense in which
there is no difference between saying that a system contains locally inaccessible
information and saying that the information is in the correlations. In both
cases this would translate into: the information is carried by joint, and not
individual, properties of subsystems. One can frequently make perfectly good
sense of a system being said to contain information about a parameter if a
suitable measurement on the system would display a probabilistic dependence
on the parameter, for then one can learn something about the parameter by
performing the measurement. But if the information is locally inaccesible, then
this means either i) for some different initial state of the global system then
there will be a probabilistic dependence for the local measurement — but this
would be physically irrelevant to the situation actually being considered; or ii)
for some measurement on the global system, a probabilistic dependence on the
parameter will be displayed — and this is no different from what one would say
on Braunstein’s account.
So where, if anywhere, does a difference lie? In marking an asymmetry. But
note that the pertinent aysmmetry may also be understood in a Schro¨dinger
picture account such as Braunstein’s. In teleportation, the point being empha-
sized is that it is the message qubits, and not Bob’s qubit, that have had the
direct dynamical coupling to the system that was prepared in the state char-
acterized by the parameter θ; and this is clear enough without invoking locally
inaccessible information. (The significance, of course, is that we know from
the no-signalling theorem that dependence on a parameter chosen in one region
may not be displayed in another unless there has been a direct, or indirect,
dynamical coupling between systems from the two regions.) Another way to
mark the asymmetry would begin by pointing out that the initial entanglement,
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the sending of the message qubits to Bob, and the correct sequence of unitary
operations being performed by Alice and Bob, are individually necessary, and
jointly sufficient conditions for a successful teleportation protocol. If we were
to miss any one of these out, then the protocol would fail, but evidently, for
different reasons in each case.
The preceding discussion indicates that under the conservative interpreta-
tion, the concept of locally inaccessible information is not playing a very useful
explanatory roˆle. It is misleading to suggest that the message qubits really carry
anything — at best this is a roundabout way of saying that joint properties do12.
This conclusion in turn casts doubt on the value of adopting either of the pro-
posed definitions of containing information in the context of the conservative
interpretation.
However, it would be precipitate to conclude from this that we may in fact
learn nothing from the analysis of teleportation in the Deutsch-Hayden formal-
ism. As suggested earlier, one can distinguish between the description using
the qi(t) being useful and the concept of locally inaccessible information being
so. Deutsch and Hayden are certainly right that an analysis in terms of their
descriptors does help emphasize the important asymmetry between the roˆles
in the protocol of sending the message qubits and the existence of the initial
entanglement; and due consideration of this asymmetry contributes, for exam-
ple, towards undermining the plausibility of a Penrose-type explanation. The
analogy with the cyphertext and key is also enlightening in this regard. But as
we have just noted, it is quite possible to mark this asymmetry without needing
to invoke talk of containing information, which has potential to mislead.
The answer to the third question under the conservative interpretation is
perhaps the most intriguing. We have seen that locally inaccessible information
does not figure successfully in an attempt to retain subsystems as information
carriers in the presence of entanglement, but have Deutsch and Hayden nonethe-
less succeeded in shedding light on the—sometimes obscure seeming—concept
of quantum information? They say, for example:
...it is impossible to characterize quantum information at a given
instant using the state vector alone. To investigate where informa-
tion is located, one must also take into account how the state came
about. In the Heisenberg picture this is taken care of automatically,
precisely because the Heisenberg picture gives a description that is
both complete and local. [9, p.1773]
It seems, though, that this suggestion would incorporate a number of confusions.
While it is true that the qi(t) provide more information than simply fol-
lowing the time evolved state would, this is not information about the time
evolution of particular systems that the latter description lacks. The qi(t) look
more informative because they capture time evolution for any given initial state,
thus they say more about the dynamics a system has been subject to; but in
the conservative interpretation, this is not to say more about the system, but
rather about the unitary operators. This extra information that one gets is not
then ‘complete’, i.e., information that would be lacking in the description of a
12Recall from the comments in Section 4.1 that we are not forced to say that the information
must be located in one system rather than another, or that it is carried by one system rather
than another. The assumption that we must is predicated upon the misleading picture of
information as a particular or substance.
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given network of systems in the Schro¨dinger picture, but is given one in Heisen-
berg. Instead, it is information about something else; about how other systems,
prepared in a different way would react, or information about, for example, the
fields that have driven the systems’ evolution.
Furthermore, one can readily accept that one has more information if one
knows how the state came about, but deny that this information is a property
that has to be located. So again, one can, in fact should, deny that there is
information located with systems that is lacking from the state vector picture.
The ‘extra’ information represented in the qi(t) consists of facts about the
unitary operations undergone; and this information cannot be said to be here,
there, or anywhere, as it makes no sense to ask where these facts are. Facts are
of the wrong logical category to possess a location (cf. [24]). The underlying
thought seems to be that the description in terms of the qi(t) allows us to
‘determine where the information about a given parameter is located at a given
instant’ [9, p.1771]. But note that the question ‘Where is the dependence on the
parameter?’ could be a bad question; one inviting us to confuse the description
of a thing with the thing itself. It is what depends on the parameter that is
important; and in entanglement assisted communication, under the conservative
interpretation, this will often only be joint, and not individual properties.
4.3.2 Ontological interpretation
The discussion of our three questions for the ontological interpretation may
be somewhat more brief. As to the first: on the ontological interpretation,
global properties are reduced to intrinsic properties of subsystems, therefore,
the properties of subsystems may indeed be thought to be carrying the infor-
mation in entanglement assisted communication protocols. Thus, adopting the
Deutsch-Hayden formalism understood in the ontological way, we would have
an explanation of teleportation in which the information that the system car-
ries as a whole can be thought a consequence of information being carried by
subsystems; in which information is genuinely carried between Alice and Bob
in the message qubits during teleportation. (Of course, this explanation may
not be reflected back onto our more usual ways of understanding quantum me-
chanics, but relies on the ontological interpretation. As such it has no power to
confute opposing views, such as Braunstein’s, that derive from a different set of
assumptions.)
Why does it now seem acceptable to say that information is carried in sub-
systems, despite the fact that it may not be possible to learn anything by per-
forming measurements on an individual system? Because in the ontological
interpretation, the explanation of the physical processes by which information
is transmitted from A to B (answering ‘How does the information get from A
to B’ in the legitimate way,) involves the intrinsic properties of subsystems de-
noted by the qi(t). In contrast to the conservative interpretation, we are now
able to answer the question ‘What depends on the parameter?’ with: the intrin-
sic properties of subsystems. As the intrinsic properties of subsystems are being
used as the information bearing properties under the ontological interpretation,
the definitions given above of containing information would have a point13.
13Although it is not clear that they are wholly trouble-free. Under definition (1), for exam-
ple, there will be cases in which a system is said to contain information locally inaccessibly,
but where it could never be made accessible, i.e. could never be displayed even under global
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Regarding the usefulness of the concept of locally inaccessible information,
the purpose of the introduction of this category is to recognise that there are
two ways in which a system may be said to carry information in the ontolog-
ical interpretation; either in its observable, or in its unobservable, empirically
inaccessible, properties. This distinction is necessary for the explanation of en-
tanglement assisted communication in the ontological interpretation, thus the
introduction of the category is useful.
In answer to our third question, however, it is important to recognise that
the ontological interpretation of Deutsch-Hayden is not providing us with an
account of a new type of information, but of new properties, new ways in which
information may be carried. Again, because this turns on the details of the
ontological interpretation, it cannot be taken to provide us with a new under-
standing of information, or quantum information, that could be transferred back
to more familiar quantum mechanical settings.
5 Conclusion
Deutsch and Hayden present their formalism as an avowedly local account of
quantum mechanics, which finally clarifies the nature of information transmis-
sion in entangled quantum systems. To what extent is this successful? We have
seen that in order to assess the claims of locality, and the claims regarding the
nature of information flow, it is essential to distinguish between a conservative
and an ontological interpretation of the formalism, as very different conclusions
follow. To summarise:
On the conservative interpretation, there are no benefits with respect to
locality that do not follow immediately from adopting a version of quantum
mechanics in which there is no genuine process of collapse and no additional
properties added (and which, consequently, would be shared by an Everettian
or a statistical interpretation); thus no distinctive feature of the Deutsch-Hayden
approach is in play. As far as information transmission is concerned, the for-
malism does not show that information is after all, a local quantity (in Deutsch
and Hayden’s sense), as it remains the case that joint, rather than individual,
properties are used to carry information in entanglement assisted communica-
tion protocols. The explanation proffered of teleportation does not differ in
substance from that which would be given by an account sharing the same ini-
tial assumptions, such as that of Braunstein. Furthermore, we have seen that
it would be confused to think that the description in terms of the qi(t) fills-in
an account of information, and where it is located in quantum systems, that is
missing in the usual Schro¨dinger picture. The additional information the qi(t)
provide (when they do so) consists of certain facts about the unitary opera-
tions undergone (not information carried by systems); and it makes no sense to
propose that these facts have a location.
With the ontological interpretation, on the other hand, we have an inter-
esting result; although one better characterized as regarding the reducibility of
measurements. This would tend to undermine the plausibility of the claim that the system
does in fact contain information, which casts doubt on the acceptability of the definition. So
again, definition (2) would seem preferable. But it might be beneficial to restrict talk of con-
taining information still further, to cases in which some particular information transmission
protocol is envisaged, or in which an agent would stand to learn something by performing
measurements on a group of systems.
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global properties of quantum systems to individual properties, rather than as
a question of locality or nonlocality. With this reducibility, the claim about
the locality of information transmission, even in the presence of entanglement,
follows. However, as the ontological interpretation provides a picture which
differs so markedly from our usual ways of understanding quantum mechanics,
these results clearly cannot be taken to shed light on the nature of information
flow in entangled quantum systems when we have not taken the dramatic step
of introducing an entirely new range of intrinsic properties of systems. And
reducibility does not come free: one is confronted with an unpleasant form of
underdetermination and the bogey of redundancy.
Unfortunately, Deutsch and Hayden do not distinguish the two different
modes of interpretation of their formalism; indeed they are arguably conflated,
to deleterious effect. The reason to believe that they must have something along
the lines of the ontological interpretation in mind is that their main claims would
not be true in any interesting way otherwise; but at certain points they would
seem to suggest clearly that the conservative reading is correct: when they im-
ply that it is merely the move to the Heisenberg picture which does the work
(p.1759); when suggesting that they have simply provided a reformulation of
Schro¨dinger picture quantum mechanics (p.1773). As we have seen, however,
if there is equivocation between the conservative and the ontological interpre-
tation, then it is impossible to draw any conclusion regarding information flow
and locality.
So, having drawn this all-important distinction, the conclusion of our discus-
sion is that in the ontological interpretation, we have a bold thesis which might
be adopted, despite its objectionable features, in order to obtain reducibility of
global properties to local properties, if this was thought particularly desirable
for some reason. Retaining the conservative approach, on the other hand, we
would have a formalism with some occasionally useful features, but not one
which provides a novel sense of locality, nor, indeed, of information flow. En
route, the discussion has hopefully shed some light on the puzzles that so often
seem to surround the question of information transmission in entangled quan-
tum systems.
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